Tax Deductibility of Commuting Expenses and Residential Land Use with more than one Center by Matthias Wrede
TAX DEDUCTIBILITY OF COMMUTING EXPENSES
AND RESIDENTIAL LAND USE WITH MORE THAN
ONE CENTER
MATTHIAS WREDE
CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 972
CATEGORY 1: PUBLIC FINANCE
JUNE 2003
PRESENTED AT CESIFO AREA CONFERENCE ON PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMICS, MAY 2003
An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com
• from the CESifo website:           www.CESifo.deCESifo Working Paper No. 972
TAX DEDUCTIBILITY OF COMMUTING EXPENSES
AND RESIDENTIAL LAND USE WITH MORE THAN
ONE CENTER
Abstract
This paper analyzes the treatment of commuting expenses by the income tax code from a
normative and a positive point of view within a continuous space framework with endogenous
residence choices and perfect labor mobility. As commuting expenses should never be
deductible from the income tax base in a first-best world, deductibility might well be the
outcome of a second-best-optimum-tax approach provided that not all factors of production
were mobile. Non-deductibility might be justified by a lack of instruments to internalize
environmental and congestion externalities or by perfect mobility of all production factors.
However, the existence of deductions in many coun-tries can be easily explained within a
public choice framework by redistribution from non-commuters to commuters. 
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1 Introduction 
Even within the group of industrialized countries tax rules concerning commuting ex-
penses vary greatly. While traveling expenses to work are not deductible in many coun-
tries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, they are (at least partially) 
deductible in the majority of the EU countries, e.g. in Germany and the Scandinavian 
countries [Oscar Faber et al. (2000), pp. 42 – 43, see also Open University (2001) and 
OECD (1993a, b)].  
In view of these differences, the extent to which commuting expenses are tax 
deductible should be clarified from an normative economic point of view. Recently, 
Wrede (2001) discussed the rationale of income tax deductions for travelling expenses 
to work relying on a first-best two-region framework with household and worker mobil-
ity. The main efficiency argument in favor of a tax relief is that workers should not be 
distorted by tax rules when choosing their place of work. Wrede (2001) came to the 
conclusion that commuting expenses should be deductible at more than 100% in order 
to ensure neutrality with respect to the choice of work, taking into account the loss of 
leisure caused by commuting. However, if the choice of the location of residence is 
causal for commuting instead of the choice of the working place, implicitly preferential 
treatment of far-off domiciles by the tax code not only reduces tax revenue but is also 
inefficient. In accordance with the latter argument the US government has always taken 
the view that commuting expenses are personal expenses and, therefore, should not be 
deductible at all [see Due (1977)]. Assuming that households are attached to particular 
places of residences and that, therefore, household mobility is not perfect, Wrede (2001) 
shows that deductibility is still optimal even if households simultaneously choose the 
place of work and the region of residence. However, if mobility were perfect, commut-
ing would be inefficient if people can live and work in either region.  
The model employed by Wrede (2001) has some shortcomings. First, since it 
considers only two regions, the residence choice is just a binary choice. Second, the 
model assumes that people can always live where they work. However, in reality com-
muting is to some extent inevitable since production and housing compete for space. - 2 - 
Third, the whole analysis is done within a first-best framework. Fourth, the model does 
not explicitly take congestion or pollution into account. This paper will overcome these 
weaknesses. Space will be considered as a continuous variable with a fixed number of 
places of work. Hence, the residence choice is no longer binary and production and 
living separate. The paper uses the classical approach towards residential land use in a 
monocentric city initiated by Alonso (1964) as its starting point and adds labor mobility 
by considering more than one city center. With respect to taxation, not only a first-best 
analysis, but also a second-best analysis is carried out. Furthermore, negative external-
ities of commuting are also considered.  
  The paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the basic model and 
derives necessary conditions for a first-best efficient allocation. Next, section three 
analyzes labor income taxation and deductibility of commuting expenses. It derives 
analytically first-best tax rules and analyzes numerically second-best taxation. Section 
four discusses briefly some extensions: externalities, additional mobility and alternative 
geography. Then, applying a simple public choice approach, section five discusses the 
issues from a positive point of view. Section six concludes. 
2  Twofold mobility and efficiency  
A region described by a straight line [0, 1] is considered with H units of land at every 
point. The region is occupied by a continuum of individuals that sums up to N. The 
non-negative “number” of individuals living at point t is denoted by N(t). N(t) is as-
sumed to be a differentiable function with the possible exception of a finite number of 
points. Since each individual has to live somewhere,  N dt ) t ( N
1
0 = ∫ . Individuals derive 
utility from non-negative private consumption and housing (for simplicity directly 
measured in units of land). All individuals are equally productive and share the same 
preferences. At either end of the line there is a city (= center) denoted by A (at location 
0) and B (at location 1) where people work. At city i, production takes place according 
to a linearly homogeneous, concave and twice continuously differentiable production 
function   with positive and decreasing marginal products F ( i i L , N F ) N and FL and com-- 3 - 
plementary factors such that  . 0 FNL >
1 Since each worker inelastically supplies one unit 
of labor,   indicates the number of workers. L  denotes a second factor of production 
(for instance, additional land, natural resources, capital, etc.). For the time being, the 
second factor of production is immobile and inelastically supplied in each city. Note 
that the technology is the same in both cities. Individuals who do not live where they 
work use resources for commuting purposes. Assuming a simple linear transportation 
cost function, commuting costs of a resident at location t are k t, where k is a strictly 
positive real number. No particular transportation costs for the consumption good are 
considered. This can be justified by assuming that transportation costs for consumption 
goods are relatively low and/or that workers pick up consumption goods at the city after 
work. Individuals are mobile with respect to both the place of residence and the place of 
work. Mobility is perfect; transaction costs are absent. Perfect mobility ensures that at 






                                
An obvious precondition for efficiency is that no two individuals exist that could 
reduce total commuting costs by exchanging residences. Hence, a location s should 
exist that divides the region into two catchment areas: all individuals living at some t < 
s work in city A (at location 0) and the residents at every t > s are part of the working 
population of B (at location 1). Hence,   and  . Throughout 
the analysis it is assumed that due to a high productivity of labor and/or low commuting 
costs net output of an additional commuter is positive in any circumstances, i.e., 
= A dt ) t ( N ∫ =
1
s B dt ) t ( N N
( 0 L , N F i N >  for i = A, B. Hence, there should be no fallow land between the two 
catchment areas.  
Another necessary efficiency condition can be easily obtained. Efficiency in 
consumption requires that the marginal rates of substitution between land and consump-
tion of all residents at a particular location have to be the same. Otherwise it would be 
possible to make residents at this location better off through exchanging goods and land 
among them. Furthermore, since utility levels are equalized among individuals, 
consumption patterns are the same for all residents at a particular location. Hence, equal 
                  
1   Derivatives are denoted by subscripts.  - 4 - 
distribution of land at each point is an efficiency condition. Individual consumption at 
point t is denoted by c(t) and individual housing (measured in units of land) by h(t), 
which is in the absence of fallow land equal to H/N(t). The mobility equilibrium condi-
tion can now be written as u(c(t), h(t)) = u(c(ε), h(ε)), for all t, ε ∈ [0, 1], where u is a 
strictly twice differentiable quasi-concave utility function with positive marginal utili-
ties. h(t) and c(t) are also differentiable functions with the possible exception of a finite 
number of points t. 
  In order to determine an efficient allocation, the following optimization problem 
has to be solved: 
(1.a)     
(1.b) s.t.  ,  , 
∫
1
0 s , N , N
), t ( h ), t ( c ), t ( N dt ) t ( N )) t ( h ), t ( c ( u Max
B A
dt ) t ( N N
s
0
A ∫ = dt ) t ( N N
1
s




dt ) t ( N ) kt
,  
(1.c)    H = h(t) N(t), for all t ∈ [0, 1], 
(1.d)   , 
(1.e)    u(c(t), h(t)) = u(c(ε), h(ε)), for all t, ε ∈ [0, 1], 
(1.f)   c(t)  ≥ 0, N(t) ≥ 0, h(t) ≥ 0, for all t ∈ [0, 1]. 
() () ∫ = +
s
0
B B A A ( c ( L , N F L , N F − + dt ) t ( N )) t 1 ( k ) t ( c ( ) t
(1.b) ensures that each individual lives and works at some, but possibly different loca-
tions. Due to (1.c) exactly the available land at every location is used for housing pur-
poses. The feasibility constraint (1.d) equates production and consumption plus com-
muting expenses and, therefore, excludes waste of producible resources. (1.e) is the 
mobility equilibrium condition.
2 Finally, the non-negativity constraints (1.f) are added. 
  In order to determine some necessary optimum conditions, it is helpful to divide 
the optimization problem into two subproblems. First, the optimum pattern of popula-
tion N(t), consumption c(t) and housing h(t) in each catchment area will be determined 
                                                 
2   If the mobility equilibrium condition were not considered as a constraint, the set of efficient alloca-
tions would be much larger and an utilitarian planner would treat equals unequally provided that the 
income elasticity of demand for space is non-zero (see Mirrlees (1972) and Wildasin (1986)). - 5 - 
provided that s, NA and NB are given. Second, the optimum division of the space into 
two catchment areas and, therefore, the working population in each city will be deter-
mined if residences are fixed (and hence N(t) and h(t) are given). While the first prob-
lem is concerned with household mobility and the allocation of space, the second prob-
lem deals with worker mobility and the allocation of labor. 
2.1  Household mobility and the optimum allocation of space 
In order to develop a simple representation of the optimization problem concerned with 
household mobility, some definitions and preliminary calculations are useful. First, a 
transfer S from the region around city B to the city A is defined. Second, two state 
variables M and X are defined, with 
     and    .  ∫ ε ε − =
t
0
A d ) ( N N ) t ( M () ∫ ε ε ε + ε − + =
t
0
A A d ) ( N ) k ) ( c ( S L , N F ) t ( X
Third, it is assumed that c, N and u are differentiable functions at (0, 1). Hence, using a 
dot over the function symbol to denote the derivative with respect to the location, the 
mobility equilibrium condition can be written as  0 dt )) t ( h ), t ( c ( du : )) t ( h ), t ( c ( u = = & . 
Using H = h(t) N(t), this condition becomes 
  .  0 ) t ( N / H ) t ( N )) t ( N / H ), t ( c ( u ) t ( c )) t ( N / H ), t ( c ( u
2
h c = − & &
Fourth, a control variable a is defined such that a . Suppressing the time index for 
the sake of a simple notation and rearranging, the optimization problem for the catch-
ment area of city A can be written as  
N & =
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  X ( 0 )   =   F() S L , N A A + , X(s) = 0, M(0) = NA, M(s) = 0, 
  0   ≤ c ≤ X, 0 ≤ N ≤ M, 
H , c ( u
H , c ( u
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where NA, S and s are taken as given. The constraints are the equations of motion of the 
four state variable c, N, X, and M and the boundary conditions. λ1 - λ4 are the respec-
tive co-state variables. The Hamiltonian function is 
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(see the appendix). People that live close to the city should be willing to pay more for 
land than those whose residences are located far away. Since all residents achieve the 
same utility level, people use more land and consume less of the consumption good the 
larger the distance to the city is (see figure 1). Moreover, the curve of the marginal rate 
of substitution (depicted against location) becomes flatter the more land people use and 
thus the further away form the city center they reside.  
Figure 1: Consumption, housing and location 
h
c




  Applying the same procedure to city B, leads to ()  for the catch-
ment area of B. Taking into account that at s land has to be divided equally among 
individuals irrespective of the place of work and using the symmetry of the derivatives 
h / k u u c h =
•- 7 - 
of the marginal rate of substitution, the marginal rate of substitution in the two catch-
ment areas can be depicted as in figure 2. Furthermore, for all ε with ε ≤ min{s, 1 – s}:  
(3) h(s  –  ε) = h(s + ε), c(s – ε) = c(s + ε) and N(s – ε) = N(s + ε). 
This symmetry condition implies that s should be larger than (equal to, smaller than) ½ 
if and only if NA is larger than (equal to, smaller than)  2 / N.   
Figure 2: Marginal rate of substitution 
s
uh/uc
1 0  
2.2  Worker mobility and the optimum allocation of labor 
Efficiency not only requires an optimum allocation of space but also an optimum alloca-
tion of labor. If residences are determined and, hence, N(t) and h(t) are given, the distri-
bution of the available quantity of the producible good is determined by the migration 
equilibrium condition and the pattern of commuting expenses. The higher total output is 
and the lower total commuting expenses are, the higher the consumption level and 
welfare are. Hence, at an optimum output minus commuting expenses is maximized. 
Taking N(t) for all t ∈ [0, 1] as given and assuming that c(t) for all t ∈ [0, 1] ensures 
that (1.d) – (1.f) are satisfied, the optimum allocation of labor is determined by solving 
   
 s.t.  A N    and   












dt ) t ( N A B N N N − = . 
Substituting for NA and NB, the first-order condition with respect to s can be written as 
(4)  .  () () ) s 1 ( k L , N F ks L , N F B B N A A N − − = −- 8 - 
At the border between the two catchment areas, the marginal product of labor net of 
commuting expenses should be independent of the place of work. If, for example, the 
marginal product of labor in city A net of commuting expenses at the border exceeded 
the marginal product of labor in city B net of commuting expenses, the catchment area 
of city A should be enlarged at the expense of city B.  
  Both catchment areas should be of equal size, i.e., s = ½, if labor intensities were 
the same, i.e., if n , where  B A n = i i i L N n = , i = A, B. If the labor intensity in city A 
were higher than in city B, the marginal product of labor would be smaller in A than in 
B, and s has to be lower than ½. Otherwise (4) would be violated. Hence, candidates for 
optima are the following allocations of the factors of production:
3 




















N F F <
A = nB, s = ½, 
(5.b) F , nA < nB, LA > LB, NA > NB, s > ½, 
(5.c)  , nA < nB, NA ≤ NB, s > ½, 
(5.d) F , nA > nB, LA < LB, NA < NB, s < ½, 
(5.e)  , nA > nB, NA ≥ NB, s < ½. 
2.3  The optimum allocation of labor and space 
An interesting question is whether all five cases described in the previous section are 
possible solutions of the optimization problem if the allocation of residences is also 
considered. The allocation (5.a) seems to be a natural candidate. Output in both regions 
would be the same. However, since this case requires that s = ½, it can only be efficient 
if NA = NB and thus LA = LB. Otherwise the symmetry condition (3) would be violated. 
(5.b) and (5.d) are also plausible candidates when the second factor of production is 
indeed immobile since the larger region would be occupied by a larger population. 
However, (5.c) and (5.e) cannot be optima, since these cases assign the larger territory 
to the smaller population, which directly contradicts the symmetry condition (3).  
                                                 
3   is used as an abbreviation for   with i = A, B and j = N, L.   i
j F ) L , N ( F i i j- 9 - 
3  Wage tax, commuting expenses and efficiency 
This section considers the impact of wage taxes on the allocation of space and labor 
within the framework developed in the previous section. Competitive markets are as-
sumed. The consumption good is used as numeraire and its price is normalized to one. 
In city i the wage rate is denoted by  , and the price of the second immobile factor of 
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N w F = i
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for i = A, B. Due to constant returns to scale, the firms’ profits are zero. All individuals 
own identical shares in land and the second factor of production. Hence, rent income 
per person is  
  N dt ) t ( q H L v L v R
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where q(t) denotes the price of one unit of land at location t. A wage tax is levied at rate 
,  . A fraction β of the commuting expenses is deductible from the tax base of 
the wage tax such that the government effectively subsidizes commuting expenses at a 
rate βτ. Tax revenue per person is 
τ 1 0 < τ ≤
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if s divides the territory into two catchment areas. In the remaining part of the paper it is 
simply assumed that lump-sum taxation is impossible and that the government has to 
levy a wage tax.  
The individuals’ decisions can be seen as a two-stage process. In the first stage, 
individuals make a decision of residence and choose the city of employment. In the 
second stage, they decide on consumption and housing, taking prices as given. Produc-
tion takes place and goods and housing markets clear. The analysis starts with the sec-
ond stage. As will be shown in a moment, consumption and housing are uniquely de-- 10 - 
termined by the location. Hence, any subscript that indicates a particular person is 
superfluous. A worker at city A who resides at location t faces the budget constraint  
  () ( ) R ) t ( h ) t ( q kt 1 w 1 ) t ( c A + − βτ − − τ − = . 
A Worker at B faces a similar restriction. A household maximizes utility u(c(t), h(t)) 
with respect to the budget constraint. Hence,  q u u c h = . The price mechanism ensures 
that marginal rates of substitution of all residents at one particular location are the same.  
The equilibrium at the first stage of the game is determined by the equal-utility 
condition. First, this mobility equilibrium condition ensures that the consumption pat-
tern is uniquely determined by the location of residence since the relative price of land q 
and, therefore, the marginal rate of substitution are the same for all residents at this 
location. Second, the mobility equilibrium condition in each catchment area can be 
written as  . In the catchment area of city A the derivative of utility with respect to 
location is 
0 u = &
( ) () ( ) ( ) h q k 1 u h u h q h q k 1 c h c & & & & − βτ − − = + − − βτ − − u u & = . By this observation 
and similar reasoning for the catchment area of B, the mobility equilibrium condition 
implies  
(6)   for t < s   and    () h / k 1 q βτ − − = & ( ) h / k 1 q βτ − = &  for t > s. 
The so-called residential bid-rent function q(t) has a negative slope in catchment 
area A and a positive slope in catchment area B (when β τ < 1). Third, from the mobil-
ity equilibrium condition follows that labor income net of taxes and commuting ex-
penses at location s has to be independent of the city of work. Hence, using the profit 
maximization conditions: 
(7)  () ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ) s 1 ( k 1 L , N F 1 ks 1 L , N F 1 B B N A A N − βτ − − τ − = βτ − − τ − . 
Finally, the symmetry condition (3) is obviously irrespective of the tax parameters 
fulfilled since the price of land and, therefore, the marginal rate of substitution between 
land and consumption and utility is the same at s for workers in A and B, and the price 
increases in both directions with the same speed.  - 11 - 
Comparing the market equilibrium conditions (6) and (7) to the necessary effi-
ciency conditions (2) and (4), the efficiency properties of the market equilibrium, the 
impact of taxation can be described. As a starting point, the first proposition states a 
non-surprising result. 
Proposition 1: In the absence of taxation, the market equilibrium is efficient.  # 
In the presence of a wage tax, in general the allocation of space and labor will not be 
first-best efficient. An obvious lemma describes the relationship between equilibrium 
conditions and efficiency conditions.  
Lemma: (a) If β = 0, the choice of residence is not distorted. (b) If β = 1, the choice of 
the working place is not distorted.  # 
The lemma states sufficient conditions for (partial) efficiency. However, these are con-
tradictory. The next proposition shows that there is one important case where neither the 
allocation of space nor the allocation of labor is distorted even in the presence of taxes. 
For this purpose it is assumed that the tax rate is strictly positive and that taxation net of 
deductions has to fulfill a particular revenue requirement: T = T.  
Proposition 2: In the presence of taxation, a first-best optimum can be achieved if and 
only if commuting expenses are not deductible (β = 0) and if the second factor of pro-
duction is symmetrically distributed, such that both catchment areas are of equal size (s 
= ½) and marginal products of labor are equalized.  # 
Proof: (a) Sufficiency is obvious. (b) β = 0 is obviously necessary to ensure an undis-
torted choice of residence within each catchment area. If β = 0 and τ ≠ 0, (7) and (4) 




N F F = A = NB (and 
therefore LA = LB) and that s = ½.  QED 
Provided that space and factors of production are symmetrically allocated at an opti-
mum, not only output net of commuting expenses but also gross output is maximized. 
The level of taxation is irrelevant in the symmetric case since the wage tax does not - 12 - 
interfere with the choice of working place. In this special case, the tax is actually a lump 
sum tax. 
  From this proposition follows immediately that taxation becomes a second-best 
problem if an asymmetric allocation is optimal. In an asymmetric environment a wage 
tax unavoidably distorts the choice of residence and / or the choice of the working 
place. The main theorem of second-best theory suggests that minimizing the number of 
distortions is not the necessarily best taxing strategy. The next proposition confirms this 
suggestion. 
Proposition 3: If the second factor of production is asymmetrically distributed, a sec-
ond-best optimum tax policy might be characterized by a strictly positive rate of deduc-
tion β. # 
The existence statement of this proposition can be proven by numerical calculations. If 
utility is quasi-linear with u = c(t) + ln h(t), housing expenses are independent of in-
come: q h = 1. The price of land and the population density N(t) = H / h(t) = H q(t) are 
exponential functions: 
  ( )( ) t s k 1 e ) s ( q ) t ( q
− βτ − =  for t ≤ s   and    ( ) ( ) s t k 1 e ) s ( q ) t ( q
− βτ − =  for t ≥ s. 
NA, s and q(s) are determined by the equilibrium condition (7) and the population con-
straints 
     and    () ( ) ∫ ∫
− βτ − = =
s
0
t s k 1
s
0
A dt e ) s ( Hq dt ) t ( N N () ( ) ∫
− βτ − − =
1
s
s t k 1
A dt e ) s ( Hq N N . 
In order to simplify, the production function is of the Cobb-Douglas type: F = 
. The parameters are H = 100, 
α − α 1 L AN N = 100, LA = 2, LB = 1, A = 10 and α = 0.5. If 
k = 0.5 and T  = 0.172837 (which is also obtained if β = 0 and τ = 0.2), the second-best 
optimum is given by β = 0.385715 and τ = 0.211755. Too few people would belong to 
the catchment area of city A and s would be too low if commuting expenses were not 
deductible at all. Although tax deductibility creates incentives to reside too far from the 
working place, it also makes it attractive to commute to a place of work which is further 
away but where labor is more productive. Even if commuting expenses were not de-- 13 - 
ductible, more people will work in the more productive city. Hence, this city is already 
surrounded by a larger catchment area which is, due to the distortion of the choice of 
the working place, too small. On average commuting distances are too short. Tax de-
ductibility leads to a beneficial shift of workers from the less productive to the more 
productive city.  
4 Extensions 
This section discusses briefly three extensions: externalities, additional mobility and 
alternative geography. 
4.1  Externalities and deductibility of commuting expenses 
Congestion and environmental externalities reduce the merits of commuting and make 
the scope for tax deductibility smaller. This will be shown for the analytically simpler 
case of environmental externalities. For that purpose, a public bad (pollution)  











dt t N ) t 1 ( dt t tN b b 0 b > ′  and  0 b ≥ ′ ′ , 
is considered. If utility is quasi-linear with  ) b ( ) h ( c u ϕ − ψ + = , 0 > ψ′ ,  ,  ϕ  
and  , the two efficiency conditions are simply  
0 < ψ′ ′ 0 > ′
0 > ϕ′ ′
  () () h b N k u u c h ′ ϕ′ + − =
•
, for t < s, () () h b N k u u c h ′ ϕ′ + =
•
, for t > s, 
  ) s 1 ( − b N k F s b N k F N N ϕ + − = ϕ + − .  () ()
B A ′ ′ ′ ′
If an emission tax is levied at a constant rate e per mile and if commuters completely 
ignore the impact of their behavior on the environmental quality, the respective market 
equilibrium conditions are  
  , for t < s,  () h / ) e k ( 1 q + βτ − − = & ( )( ) h / e k 1 q + βτ − = &  for t > s, 
  () ( )( ) ( )( )1 ( e k 1 F
B
N + βτ − − τ ) s 1 s e − − = k 1 F 1
A
N + βτ − − τ −   ) (
provided that emission tax payments are also (partially) deductible from the tax base. 
The following proposition analyzes the relationship between the degree of internaliza-
tion and tax deductibility. - 14 - 
Proposition 4: If the emission tax is too low ( b N ′ ϕ′ < e ) and if the second factor of 
production is asymmetrically allocated, then an efficient choice of residence requires β 
< 0 and an efficient choice of the working place β < 1.  # 
This result suggests that at an second-best optimum the degree of deductibility is lower 
than in the absence of negative external effects if the emission tax internalizes the ex-
ternal effect only partially. If, in contrast, the emission tax were too high, an efficient 
choice of residence would require β > 0 and an efficient choice of the working place β > 
1.  
The qualitative result of the proposition holds if congestion externalities are con-
sidered. Finally, it should be stressed that this section has oversimplified by assuming 
that all trips to cities are made for commuting purposes. If other purposes are taken into 
account, reducing the proportion to which commuting expenses are deductible becomes 
a less well suited substitute for missing Pigouvian taxes. 
4.2  Additional mobility and deductibility of commuting expenses 
So far it has been assumed that the second factor of production is immobile. If, how-
ever, this factor were mobile, a first best optimum is additionally characterized by equal 
marginal products of this production factor and, therefore, equal labor intensities. If, 
however, labor intensities were equalized across cities, efficient allocation of labor 
together with the symmetry condition requires a symmetrical allocation of labor and 
residents. Thus:  








L F F = A = nB, LA = LB, NA = NB, s = ½. 
Because of commuting expenses, the allocation is determined. In the absence of com-
muting expenses any allocation of both production factors with identical labor intensi-
ties would be equally good.  
Due to the symmetry, as a corollary of proposition 2 the following statement can 
be derived. - 15 - 
Corollary: In the presence of taxation and perfect mobility of all factors of production, 
a first-best optimum can be achieved if and only if commuting expenses are not de-
ductible (β = 0).  # 
The mobile second factor of production enforces equal labor intensities and the zero 
deduction rate ensures an efficient choice of residences. An asymmetric equilibrium 
could not exist because of the mobility equilibrium condition. 
  If production were not restricted to the cities A and B, it should take place along 
the entire line. Because of convex preferences, the population density should be uniform 
(N(t) ≡  N). Commuting would be inefficient and people should work were they live. 
Tax deductibility of commuting expenses would be superfluous. With constant returns 
to scale, agglomeration and commuting are rooted in the immobility of production 
factors and locations of production. If, in contrast, production were characterized by 
increasing returns to scale, agglomeration and commuting would be efficient even if all 
production factors were mobile and if production were not restricted to particular loca-
tions. In order to determine the impact of taxation, a detailed knowledge of agglomera-
tion forces is necessary. If, however, a symmetric allocation were efficient and also the 
equilibrium outcome (for instance with two cities at ¼ and ¾ and s = ½), a zero tax 
deductibility rate would be optimal provided that gross wages are given by marginal 
products of labor.   
4.3  Geography and deductibility of commuting expenses 
Up to now space has been modeled in the most simplest way: Two cities are located at 
the ends of a straight line and people live in between. Results might be different if 
geography were altered.  
  First, commuting expenses should be non-deductible if the catchment areas were 
separated by an unoccupied area because of a ceiling on floorspace per person. If 
choices were restricted by h(t) ≤ H (since the “number” of persons N(t) = H / h(t) has to 
exceed one) and if the region were sparsely populated, the centrally located area would 
be unoccupied even if the price of land were zero. Tax deductibility could not have any 
positive impact since the choice of the working place is not directly distorted by the - 16 - 
wage tax. Separation of catchment areas restores the monocentric city model. Tax de-
ductions would distort the choice of residences and would increase total gross commut-
ing costs.  
  Second, the results stated by the propositions hold true if more than one road 
connects the two cities, for example, if A and B are located on a circle [see figure 3.a]. 
Moreover, if the cities are not located at the ends of the line [see figure 3.b], the qualita-
tive results do not change. Even if more than one dead-end street starts at both cities 
[see figure 3.c], the analysis is still valid. Finally, if there are more than two cities, 
either located on a straight line or on a circle, the analysis is in principle the same. 
However, if A and B did not mark the ends of the road [as in figures 3.b and c], the 
optimum catchment area of the city that is endowed with a higher quantity of the second 
factor of production might even capture the other city’s environs. The working popula-
tion of the less productive city would completely live at one side of the city. But even in 
this case non deductible commuting expenses would distort the allocation of labor.  
Figure 3: Alternative road networks 
A
B                0 B A 1                 B A  
(a)                                  (b)                                     (c) 
  Third, if for any given quantities of the second production factor and of land the 
population per mile shrinks, the distortion of the allocation of labor through the tax 
system becomes less strong and tax deductions should be reduced. For example, when 
the number of dead-end streets in the case described by figure 3.c increases, ceteris 
paribus the optimum tax deduction rate should shrink. If the number of streets goes to 
infinity, commuting expenses should not be deductible.  
5  Exploitation by commuters 
Although partial deduction of commuting expenses might be a second-best optimum tax 
policy, the basic model as well as the extensions have shown that a zero deduction rate - 17 - 
is nevertheless often optimal. Since commuting expenses are deductible in several 
countries, an interesting question is whether commuters who live far from the cities are 
willing to exploit non-commuters through tax deductibility even if commuting expenses 
should not be deductible for reasons of efficiency. In order to answer this question a 
simple three-stage political economy model is employed. At the first stage, applying the 
majority rule, perfectly foresighted and utility maximizing citizens decide on the tax 
rate τ and the rate of deduction β. Any other ways of redistribution, in particular lump-
sum redistribution, are excluded by assumption. At the second stage, individuals decide 
on residences and working places. At the third stage, production takes place and taxes 
are levied. Tax revenue is redistributed in a lump-sum way and people consume. The 
second and third stages were described by the basic model of this paper. To strengthen 
the efficiency argument, the choice of working place is assumed away by considering 
just one city where people work located at point 0, i.e., by arguing in the monocentric 
city framework.  
  If all individuals were equally endowed and if preferences were also identical, 
non-commuters could not be exploited by commuters since perfect mobility ensures that 
all citizens are equally well off. Some ex-ante heterogeneity is necessary. If, for in-
stance, the population consisted of groups with different labor productivity and, hence, 
different income, the population would be stratified ex post as well, provided that the 
demand for space is a monotonically increasing function of income. When commuting 
costs per mile are independent of income, the wealthy have a flatter bid-rent function. 
Consequently the poor occupy land close to the city center
4. In this paper, heterogeneity 
with respect to “distance aversion“ will be considered. The population is divided into 
two groups whose members have different preferences for distance but are otherwise 
identical. Utility is quasi-linear with  ( ) t n h c i i i i u − ψ + = ,  i = 1, 2,  with  , 
, and  . A higher   indicates a higher aversion to distance. At the equi-
librium individuals with high distance aversion (n
0 > ψ′
0 < ψ′ ′ 2 1 n n > i n
1), i.e., the members of the first group, 
                                                 
4   This is the prediction of  the theory of income segregation developed by Alonso (1964) and Muth 
(1969). - 18 - 
live closer to the city than members of the second group because of the magnitudes of 
the bid-rent curves’ slopes:  
  2 2 2 1 1 1 q q n k ) 1 ( n k ) 1 ( q q & & = + βτ − > + βτ − = . 
The boundary is denoted by s. This holds true whether income is taxed or not and 
whether commuting expenses are deductible or not. The equilibrium is characterized by 
segregation [see figure 4.a, where the bid-rent-curves are depicted ].  












(a)                                                             (b) 
If (for the sake of simplicity) the entire income is taxable and gross income per person 
is denoted by y, than tax revenue per person is  












+ τβ − τ = ∫ ∫ , 
where  i N  denotes the “number” of individuals belonging to group i and Ni(t) the den-
sity of group i at location t. Since gross income is exogenous and tax revenue is redis-
tributed in a lump-sum way, only τ β matters not β alone.  
  Tax deductibility of commuting expenses affects citizens in two ways. First, it 
distorts the choice of residences. The bid-rent curve becomes flatter. People want to live 
farther away from the city. This first effect hurts both groups. The second group, living 
far away from the city, is not only harmed because the allocation of land within their 
group is distorted, but also because the other group expands their territory [see figure 
4.b]. Second, it redistributes resources from non-commuters and short-distance com-
muters to long-distance commuters. The second effect, therefore, benefits the group 
with the higher preference for distance at the expense of the first group. Putting both 
effects together, it becomes obvious that the first group clearly opposes tax deduction of - 19 - 
commuting expenses. Hence, tax deduction can only be the outcome of the vote at the 
first stage of the game if the second group is the majority. Furthermore, if the share of 
the second group goes to one, the distortionary effect exceeds the distribution effect 
such that even the second group rejects tax deductibility of commuting expenses.
5 How-
ever, by numerical calculations it could be shown that in between a non-zero rate of tax 
deductibility is the outcome of the game. If, for example, ψ(h) = ln(h) and H = 3.14, k = 
2, n1 = 2, n2 = 1,  1 N  = 100 and  2 N  = 100 + ε, where ε is close to zero, the majority 
would set τ β = 0.256796.  
The next proposition summarizes the findings.  
Proposition 5: If the share of the long-distance commuters is higher than ½ but suffi-
ciently low, utility functions and parameters such that the majority exploits the minority 
by an inefficient non-zero deduction rate for commuting expenses exist.  # 
This qualitative result would still hold if the population were divided into more than two 
groups. 
6 Concluding  remarks 
This paper has analyzed the treatment of commuting expenses by the income tax code 
from a normative and a positive point of view within a continuous-space framework 
with endogenous residence choices and perfect labor mobility. The following main 
results were derived.  
  First, in order to avoid a distortion of residential land use, commuting expenses 
should never be deductible from the income tax base in a first-best world. Hence, in a 
monocentric city deductibility is clearly inefficient.  
Second, if some factors of production were immobile and asymmetrically allo-
cated, a first-best optimum is unattainable if the government has to levy a wage tax. In 
order to minimize the excess burden with respect to the distortion of residential land use 
and the distortion of the geographical pattern of labor supply, it could be right to par-
                                                 
5   If the share were equal to one, redistribution would be impossible.  - 20 - 
tially deduct commuting expenses from the income tax base. The analysis of this paper, 
therefore, achieves, for quite different reasons, a similar result as Wrede (2000). He 
showed that in a second-best world with endogenous labor supply, but in the absence of 
mobility, time-saving commuting expenditure (e.g., the choice of the faster car instead 
of the slower public transportation system) should be deducted only partially to reduce 
distortions due to high wages taxes.  
Third, non-deductibility might be justified by a lack of instruments to internalize 
environmental and congestion externalities [for a recent analysis of alternative policies 
for reducing traffic congestion see Parry (2002)]. The qualitative result holds if conges-
tion externalities are considered. This is certainly not the first paper that has analyzed 
substitutes for direct Pigouvian taxes to internalize traffic externalities. For example, 
using a calibrated numerical model, recently Chia, Tsui and Whalley (2001) considered 
ownership taxes as congestion correcting instruments. Calthrop (2001) analyzes a con-
gestion toll when trips are made for different purposes but when the administrative costs 
of a differentiated tolling system are prohibitively high. He argues for a uniform con-
gestion toll combined with a subsidy to commuters since the degree of Hicksian com-
plementarity of commuting with leisure is comparatively small. However, when one 
takes, in contrast to Calthrop (2001), labor mobility into account, subsidizing commut-
ers might well be inefficient.  
Fourth, it is shown that, even in a monocentric city where commuting expenses 
should not be deductible from an efficiency point of view, a majority of long-distance 
commuters might vote in favor of a deduction since it redistributes towards commuters. 
Beyond the normative approach, this result is an additional explanation for the existence 
of deductions in many countries.  
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Appendix: Optimum allocation of space 
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